The divergent jurisprudence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the death penalty in Africa

1 INTRODUCTION

While in some African societies the death penalty is traced back to the pre-colonial era, in others it was introduced during colonial rule. However, many post-independence African states extended the application of the death penalty to offences that were not included during colonial rule.1 A historical examination of the death penalty in Africa can help dispel the misconception that it is solely a legacy of colonial rule, while also providing essential context for understanding the continent’s abolitionist movement.2 The global trend towards the universal abolition of the death penalty is spearheaded at the global level by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and its treaty bodies; at the regional level it is exemplified by developments in Europe, and overall it is marked by robust abolitionist campaigns and advocacy by national and international organisations. African domestic and regional legal and human rights systems are being induced to keep pace with the changing tempo.

At the UN level, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration)3 in 1948 and, significantly for this article, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4 (ICCPR) in 1966 reinforced the abolitionist movement. The global trend towards abolition is particularly evident in the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (ICCPR-OP2), adopted in 1989, which lays the foundation for the global movement.5 Although the Universal Declaration does not expressly mention the ‘death penalty’, the guarantee of the right to life under article 3, combined with referrals to it by numerous UN resolutions on the abolition of death penalty, strongly suggests that it favours abolition.6

Article 6 of ICCPR, which also guarantees the inherent right to life and prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life (article 6(1)), goes on to expressly provide for various aspects relating to the death penalty. It does not abolish it, but limits the imposition of the death penalty to the most serious crimes pursuant to the law (article 6(2)); provides for the accused’s right to seek pardon or commutation of the death sentence (article 6(4)); prohibits the imposition of the sentence to persons under 18 and its execution on pregnant women (article 6(5)); and prohibits invoking the provision to prevent the abolition of capital punishment (article 6(6)).7 The international commitment to abolish the death penalty and what Chenwi terms the ‘desirability’ of the abolition manifests in the adoption of ICCPR-OP2, which prohibits executions and calls for measures to abolish the death penalty within the jurisdiction of state parties.8

By the end of 2025, ICCPR-OP2 has been acceded to or ratified by 92 of the 174 state parties to ICCPR.9 Of these, 18 are African states.10 While the limited number of ratifications by African states raises questions regarding their commitment to the abolition of the death penalty,11 the accession by Zambia and Côte d’Ivoire to ICCPR-OP2 in 2024 exemplifies a growing consensus on the continent towards abolition.12 As abolition campaigns continue, scholars and activists stress that African states that have abolished the death penalty should ratify ICCPR-OP2, to signal and confirm their irreversible commitment to abolition.13

At the regional level, within the African Union (AU) - the umbrella organisation of African states - there is no binding instrument requiring the abolition of the death penalty. This position is weak compared to the abolitionist stance of the Council of Europe (CoE) - the custodian of the oldest human rights system (the European human rights system).14 Arguably, the AU position is not surprising considering the non-existence of any similar framework within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), under which human rights was initially not a priority.15 Also, as Demana argues, any condemnation of the death penalty was largely hinged on the OAU’s vigorous stance against the apartheid regimes in Southern Africa.16

In Europe, the commitment to abolish the death penalty evolved over time. The CoE founded in 1949 (by only 10 members) adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom (European Convention) in 1950 whose additional protocols are of particular significance. These are Protocol 6 to the European Convention Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty (Protocol 6) adopted in 198317 and Protocol 13 to the Convention Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances (Protocol 13) adopted in 2002.18 Protocol 6 prohibits the execution of the death penalty during the time of peace19 while Protocol 13 abolishes the death penalty in all circumstances.20 Both prohibit reservations.21 On this basis, the CoE set a condition for interested states to ratify the European Convention and Protocol 13 before joining the organisation and, by default, completely limits the imposition of the death penalty within the jurisdictions of its current 46 member states.22

Although the OAU’s successor, the AU, has been a flag bearer of human rights on the continent, it has not paid heed to the call from, among others, its own organ, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission), of delegitimising the death penalty.23 As far back as 2015, the African Commission adopted a draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Abolition of the Death Penalty (African Death Penalty Abolition Protocol), committing state parties to abolish the death penalty by appropriate legislative, institutional and other measures.24 It additionally binds states to a moratorium on the imposition and execution of the death sentence during the transitional period leading to complete abolition enacted through domestic legislation.25 However, by the end of 2025 - a decade later - the AU has not taken any pertinent steps to adopt this draft as an official AU treaty. The substantive provisions of the African Death Penalty Abolition Protocol are largely similar in content and objective to those under ICCPR-OP2, with the notable exception of the moratorium clause related to the transitional period leading to the legislative enactment of complete abolition.26 ICCPR-OP2 does not bind state parties to suspend the imposition and execution of the death penalty while necessary legislation for abolition is being enacted.

A further normative gap in the AU regional human rights framework on the abolition of the death penalty stems from the absence of express condemnation of the death penalty under articles 4 and 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter),27 which mirror the previously cited provisions of the Universal Declaration and ICCPR. This contrasts with the firmly consolidated position at the European regional level marked by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in 2000, which prohibits the imposition and execution of the death penalty as well as the extradition of a person to a state with the likelihood of subjecting them to a capital punishment.28

Due to the absence of a mandatory prohibition on the imposition and execution of the death penalty on the African continent, countries’ positions on the death penalty vary widely. Nonetheless, a movement towards the continental abolition of the death penalty is gaining momentum. The Death Penalty Project records of the status of death penalty abolition in Africa indicate that 26 African countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, while four have done so for ordinary crimes, bringing the total of ‘abolitionist’ countries to 30.29 This trend is also manifest in the votes recorded at the adoption of the tenth resolution for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty by the UN General Assembly in December 2024.30 Thirty-three African countries voted in favour of the resolution, compared to 29 countries in 2022. Burundi changed its vote from ‘against’ to ‘in favour’; Gabon, Kenya, Morocco and Zambia progressed from abstaining to voting in favour; and Somalia, Seychelles, and São Tomé and Príncipe moved from a recorded ‘no vote’ to voting in favour of the resolution.

This article aims to contribute to discussions about the jurisprudence of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) in death penalty cases.31 The decisions of the Court on these cases have enabled it to shape the normative framework on the issue, despite being dominated by varying interpretations of relevant human rights norms among judges, that magnifies a stance that diverges from the global abolitionist trend. The Court had received over 20 death penalty cases between 2015 and 2020, all of which were submitted on allegations of violations of fair trial rights pursuant to article 7(1) of the African Charter.32 The Rajabu case is the first and the most prominent death penalty case heard by the Court.33 However, there are additional landmark cases on the subject, such as Mulokozi Anatory v Tanzania and Evodius Rutechura v Tanzania.34 By the end of 2025, when this article was finalised, the number of death penalty cases had increased to 25 identified cases.

The following part provides an account of the Court’s reasoning that expands on the raison d’être of its reasoning in Rajabu,35 the bedrock of all subsequent decisions on death penalty matters before the Court. The ensuing part addresses factors that prevent the Court from reaching a unanimous position on the abolition of the death penalty, as such, in Africa. Finally, it concludes by highlighting the fact that all the evils that afflicted humanity - slavery, colonialism, apartheid, and so forth - were addressed through the law; in this context, the legal justifications for the death penalty effectively ‘further legitimise cold-blooded killing as justice’.36

2 STRETCHING THE RAISON D’ÊTRE OF THE REASONING IN RAJABU

The death penalty cases that have been decided on merits before the African Court are all against Tanzania, a de facto abolitionist state,37 with a moratorium on the execution of death sentences. This, indeed, is reflective of how Tanzania is, as Novak remarks, ‘a slippery target for advocates challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty’.38 This part takes stock of the reasoning in death penalty cases,39 decided after the African Court’s judgment in Rajabu,40 to highlight the extent to which the Court sought to subsequently clarify its reasoning in Rajabu.

In light of existing commentaries on Rajabu that comprehensively detail the facts and summary of the case,41 it suffices to recap the main question that the Court addressed in its reasoning.42 This was ‘whether the legal provision of the mandatory imposition of the death sentence in cases of murder violates the right to life guaranteed in article 4 of the Banjul Charter’.43 Due to the absence of express reference to the death penalty under article 4, the Court reasoned that to examine the legality of the death penalty through this provision would entail an assessment of whether its imposition constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life.44

After a recourse to case law, including the African Commission jurisprudence, the Court instituted three-pronged criteria for assessing whether the deprivation of life is arbitrary in the context of article 4.45 Its assessment requires that the imposition of the death sentence must (i) be provided by law; (ii) be imposed by a competent court; and (iii) adhere to due process. The Court found the respondent in violation of the right to life for failing to ensure due process in sentencing.46 It also ruled that the respondent violated fair trial rights as the mandatory nature of the death sentence stripped the domestic court of the discretion to independently evaluate the facts and apply the law. The Court also found the respondent in violation of article 5, holding that the method of execution - hanging - encroaches upon dignity in respect of the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.47

Notably, in cases subsequent to Rajabu, the Court built on fair trial guarantees to broaden the scope of rights violation caused by the imposition of death penalty under article 7 of the African Charter. While in Rajabu the violation of fair trial rights was hinged on the High Court’s inability to uphold fairness and due process, in Henerico,48 it was based on the inability of the High Court to consider the medical evaluation report on the applicant’s mental status, as the Court held that it constituted a grave procedural irregularity. In another case, the Court found the respondent in violation of article 7 based on its failure to notify the applicant, in the proceedings that led to the death sentence, of his right to consular assistance despite knowing that he was a foreign detainee.49

At this juncture, it suffices to appreciate Novak’s observation that the Court was able to extend its reasoning in Romward,50 by transforming the emphasis, in determining the legality of the imposition of the mandatory death penalty, on fair trial rights into an analysis centred on human dignity under article 5.51 Parallel to this very concept, the Court provided an extended interpretation of the right to dignity in Misalaba, holding as follows:52

The right to dignity captures the very essence of the inherent worth and value that resides within every individual, irrespective of their circumstances, background, or choices. At its core, it embodies and upholds the principle of respect for the intrinsic humanity of each person and forms the bedrock of what it means to be truly human. It is in this sense that Article 5 absolutely prohibits all forms of treatment that undermines the inherent dignity of an individual.

In a similar context, the African Court endeavoured to stretch the elements of the violation of the right to dignity to include a lengthy period on death row awaiting execution. In Mwita, where the applicant had spent seven years on death row, 53after the conclusion of all judicial proceedings in her case, the Court held ‘that such detention and the length of time thereof have inevitably caused the applicant to endure a level of suffering that infringes upon her dignity’.54 A similar conclusion was reached in Msuguri, where the time spent on death row was 12 years.55 Equating the ensuing harm with the ‘ever present shadow of death’, the Court found the respondent in violation of article 5 with regard to the applicant’s continued detention on death row.56

Occasionally, the Court has, on its own initiative (suo motu), raised and addressed additional rights violations that the applicant did not raise particularly concerning the legality of the conviction and the death sentence. Novak notes this trend in Jeshi and Kakobeka, where the applicant made no submission on the death penalty or hanging, and where the applicant made no submission on the right to dignity, respectively.57 In a similar way, even though the applicant had only alleged a violation of his right to dignity in Mulokozi, the Court identified and ruled on a violation of the right to life based on the fact that his murder conviction and death sentence by hanging relied on a caution statement which he later retracted.58

3 THE DIVERGENCE: LACK OF CONSENSUS ON THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN AFRICA

The key factor that hinders the African Court from adopting a unanimous stance that reflects the global death penalty abolitionist movement is the divergent interpretation of the wording of article 4 of the African Charter.59 The majority of the Court cling to the absence of the term ‘death penalty’ in the provision to interpret article 4 to ‘imply that the death penalty is permissible as an exception to the right to life under article 4 as long as it is not imposed arbitrarily’.60 The minority, comprising Tchikaya J and Ntsebeza J, are against that stance and their position is that the death penalty has no place in the human rights discourse as nothing about the death penalty is acceptable.61 In other words, they view the right to life and the sanctity of human life as inherently incompatible with the death penalty.62

Against that background, while the majority of the African Court resorted to qualifying the death penalty in the meaning of article 4 with the three-pronged test, in an effort, as Novak rightly puts it, ‘not to cast doubt on the lawfulness of the death penalty per se’, the minority called this approach inadequate,63 partial64 and minimalistic.65 The majority interpreted article 4 to mean that the African Charter contemplates the deprivation of life through the death penalty as long as it is not mandatory.66 In other words, arguably, the ‘mandatory’ imposition is deemed the threshold for arbitrariness of the sentence. It even goes on to pronounce its decision focusing on the categories of death penalty rather than focusing, overall, on condemnation of the death penalty.67

In contrast, the minority judges are of the view that the death penalty has always been arbitrary,68 and that a mandatory death penalty constitutes a violation of the right to life as much as the death penalty itself.69 Tchikaya J further terms the denouncement of the ‘mandatory’ death penalty alone ‘out of step’70 with the constant conviction of the International Law Commission (ILC) for the promise of the abolition of death penalty in the enhancement of human dignity and fundamental rights.71 He further suggests that the lack of express reference to the death penalty under article 4 implies that it is neither authorised nor prohibited.72

Therefore, according to the judge and, rightly so, in my view, the wording of the provision accords the Court the autonomy to amplify the abolitionist trend that upholds the right to life.73 Referring to a wide range of supporting authorities, he stresses that ‘the Court has at its disposal sufficient regional practice by African states to proceed, on the one hand, to an interpretation of Article 4 denying the legality of the death penalty’.74 ‘On the other hand’, the judge continued, the Court could also proceed by requiring the abolition of this penalty in national legislation ‘insofar as it has become contrary to human rights and to its development’.75 Ntsebeza J reinforces this argument by further providing reasons for abolishing the death penalty.76 These five reasons are (i) that it is irreversible and mistakes happen; (ii) that it does not deter crime; (iii) that it is often used within skewed justice systems; (iv) that it is discriminatory; and (v) that it is used as a political tool.77

In the very line of argument, the minority judges advance and emphasise the importance of the Court to invoke its praetorian power78 for the adoption of an interpretation of article 4 that denies the legality of the death penalty. Tchikaya J raised this point in his separate opinion in Rajabu, where he finds the Court’s reasoning regarding the right to life unclear and ‘an unexplained search for the absolute and the lack of the praetorian commitment [that] limit the Court’s power of interpretation’.79 Once again, in his joint separate opinion to Msuguri, Mwita and Iguna, he stressed the importance of the Court to use its praetorian power as a catalyst for the continent to join the international movement towards the abolishment of the death penalty in order to uphold the right to life.80 In the same vein, Tchikaya and Ntsebeza JJ raised a similar argument in their joint dissenting opinion to Mulokozi as they remarked on Rutechura where they admitted to have endorsed the Court’s finding of no violation of article 7 by the respondent over the applicant who had been sentenced to death by hanging for murder.81 However, they highlighted that it would have been desirable and a welcome extension of its praetorian power had the Court taken a position on the underlying issue of the death penalty within the normative principles of the right to life.

The wording of article 4 is not the only point of divergence by the Court. There are varying interpretations of the right to dignity under article 5, particularly as pertains to methods of execution of death sentences. It suffices to note that there are lines of convergence in the appreciation of the concept of human dignity between the majority and the minority of the bench. Having regard to the extended interpretation of the concept by the Court in Misalaba, a similar take can be noted in a dissenting opinion to Lazaro by Ntsebeza J who reiterates that ‘the concept of human dignity lies at the core of international human rights’.82 Tchikaya J goes even further and clarified the wording of article 5:83

This provision of the Charter is unambiguous in all its content. The drafters of the Charter highlighted the three dimensions of human rights that the death penalty sets out to deny: a) Firstly, dignity, because what is denied by death row is ultimately, through profound alienation, the human person; b) Secondly, there is the denial of legal status, because the death penalty is a kind of legal aporia. It puts an end to a person’s existence, even though his or her rights presuppose a physical presence; finally, there is the physical and moral torture denounced in Article 5. Such torture is inherent in any form of death sentence, not to mention cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

The majority of the Court adopted, as it did with article 4, three factors for determining the violation of the right to dignity.84 It pronounced that article 5 has no limitation clause; the prohibition must be interpreted to extend to the widest possible protection against abuse, whether physical or mental; and that personal suffering and indignity can take various forms, the assessment of which will depend on the circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, based on the reasoning of the Court in various death penalty cases, the minority deemed its conclusions that uphold the death penalty unconscionable85 and paradoxical.86 The Court interprets the meaning of article 5 in determining rights violations arising from the methods used to implement the death penalty. This is addressed in his dissent to Lazaro, where Ntsebeza J argues that

no termination of life, in whatever form, whether by electrocution, or by lethal injection, hanging, gas chamber asphyxiation, decapitation - none at all ... escapes being an affront to the dignity right protected by Article 5. Every killing of a human being, by another individual ... or even by the State, is, conceptually, undignified.87

A similar sentiment is advanced by Tchikaya J who remarks that no technique humanises or legalises the death penalty.88 This is reinforced by Ntsebeza J in his dissent to Lazaro, where he contests the restriction of the violation of article 5 to the method of execution, and submits that it should be construed to the overall meaning of capital punishment for its cruel, inhumane, degrading and torturous nature.89 Tchikaya J considers this approach of the Court contradictory as it indirectly invalidates the death penalty considering the fact that it has often been part and parcel of death row and confinement.90 He stresses the dispensation of the discretion of the Court to place the violation in the legal context,91 particularly by taking its reasoning to its logical conclusion through simply banishing capital punishment in all its forms from the African legal order.92

In addition to the foregoing, there are more aspects that raise diverging stances by the Court. These are the question of the absoluteness of the abolition of the death penalty and the principle of compliance of national repressive law with international law. Starting with the question of the absoluteness of the death penalty, notably, the Court refrained from exercising its discretion to declare the death penalty unlawful within the meaning of article 4. This restraint stems from the Court’s observation that the prohibition of death sentence under international law remains not-absolute93 owing to the absence of a universally ratified treaty on the death penalty.94 The minority were certain to vigorously challenge the majority’s position, substantiating their arguments with a wide range of international principles that illustrate a trend towards the abolition of the death penalty.95 Their argument for denying the legality of the death penalty is hinged on the dire need for the Court to keep up with international law,96 particularly considering the existing backing97 of the social values and legal norms.

Turning next to the divergence of opinions on the principle of compliance of national repressive law with international law that, notably, arises from the tendency of the Court to defer to the domestic courts the assessment on the proportionality of the death sentence with incidents of crime. In Mwita, for instance, it was held that ‘[h]owever, since the circumstances for which the death penalty may be appropriate cannot be categorised with exactitude, the determination of incidents of crimes warranting the imposition of the death penalty must be left to domestic courts to decide on a case-by-case basis’.98 This was also reiterated verbatim in Mulokozi.99

The minority judges have pronounced their position against leaving the imposition of the death penalty to the discretion of national authorities considering the principle of compliance of national repressive law with international law.100 This is further reinforced by Chikaya J in his dissent to Mwita, where he invokes the Permanent Court’s principle of ‘non-invocability of constitutional provisions against international law’ to stress on the superiority of international law to all categories of internal and material rules.101 He advances similar views in his dissent to Chalula where he points at the unacceptability, even in the name of state sovereignty, of justifying the discretion of outlier states not to cooperate with an emerging clear trend such as the abolition of the death penalty.102 The Court’s tendency is deemed by the minority ‘legally inadmissible and an anachronistic to impede the global will to put an end to the death penalty with national idiosyncrasies’.103

4 CONCLUSION

The absence of a normative continental framework and coordinated scheme for the abolition of the death penalty in Africa similar to that in Europe has technically left the African Court’s involvement through its case law as the only legal outlet for binding decisions.104 Over the years, considering that by 2015 the Court had already deliberated on approximately 20 death penalty cases and the number has since increased, it has exercised its interpretation power to chart a legal landscape that defines the African stance on the global death penalty abolitionist movement, albeit at the AU level. In addition to the promising detailed initiatives to expand the raison d’être of Rajabu, it is equally encouraging to note that through the Court’s interpretation and pronouncements in death penalty cases, it has evidently complemented the jurisprudence construed by the African Commission. As Novak remarks, this was through clarifying and simplifying the permissible standards articulated in the African Commission communications relating to mandatory death penalty and hanging.105

The significant number of compelling dissenting opinions that diverge from majority rulings, as highlighted in the article, underscores the urgent need for the Court to harmonise and streamline its position on the death penalty in correspondence with the impetus of protection of rights. In light of this need for harmonisation several aspects below could prove useful in providing guidance particularly as relating to the Court’s ‘alternativist’ approach, as characterised by Tchikaya and Ntsebeza JJ,106 which confers legality to the death penalty solely based on their incorporation in laws of some African states.

The issue with this approach is the fact that all historical evils that plagued the human race - slavery, Jim Crow laws in the United States, the Holocaust, apartheid, and so forth - were according to the law. As such, relying on the legality of the death penalty by a human rights court is not justice, but rather it is legitimising premeditated killing by the state, and is an insult to the legal process and a betrayal of the sacred right to life. Therefore, arguably, the position of the dissenting minority in the death penalty cases before the African Court, by implication, rightly conveys the reality that the fact that the universal abolition of the death penalty is not absolute does not exempt countries that retain it from violation of the right to life regardless of theoretical safeguards in place. This is because even though the law prescribes ‘safeguards’, in reality there is no ‘safeguarded death penalty’ or a good death penalty107 and the law must align with observable conditions to maintain legitimacy. Ultimately, the African Court ought to pick a side that is reflective of its purpose and mandate - the strong abolitionist side.

An additional aspect that may guide the Court’s harmonisation of its stance on the abolition of the death penalty in Africa emanates from best practices witnessed at the European level. The comprehensive abolitionist efforts within the CoE demonstrates a top-down scheme entailing the adoption of binding instruments, most notably Protocol 13 establishing the complete domestic abolition of death penalty as a prerequisite for accession to both the CoE and the EU. Tchikaya J supports this framework and acknowledges the importance of the adoption of Protocol 13, cemented by the Al-Saadoon case,108 in the European regional abolitionist campaign as an indication of the final step towards the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances. It is against this background that he implores the Court to take note and follow up on the global abolitionist trend.109 More explicitly, in his Declaration for the Jeshi case, he expressed the view that the Court ‘must declare that capital punishment is unacceptable, as the European Court of Human rights has done’.110 While this statement may be criticised for exhibiting a very uncritical and deferential view of the European position, it also underlines the presence of a proponent of a top-down approach among the judges which, arguably, is a promising starting point for attaining a harmonised stance of the Court on the abolition of the death penalty in Africa.

In his keynote address,111 Ntsebeza J hinted at a concept of a bottom-up scheme geared at persuading the adjustment of the jurisprudence of the Court to adopt the global abolitionist trend. He remarked that ‘although there are still areas for improvement and given its evolutive character there is every opportunity that the jurisprudence of the Court may eventually be persuaded by the development by member states of the AU especially the abolitionists’. This remark envisages that initiatives at the domestic level, perhaps when the number of abolitionist states increases, might persuade the Court to also adopt an abolitionist stance. Unfortunately, that will have to be tested, and it holds less to no promise that this can be realised even in a context where states maintain the death penalty in their domestic laws under the guise of sovereignty, with the Court providing support for that position.

An approach with some chance of success is the adoption of a top-down mechanism akin to that implemented at the European regional level, that is, the AU adopting the African Death Penalty Abolition Protocol which, upon ratification, would become binding on respective member states. However, the question may be posed as to the difference the adoption of the African Death Penalty Abolition Protocol would make in practice. It still needs to be ratified by states, and it logically is more likely that the same states that have already ratified ICCPR-OP2 would also ratify the Protocol. It is an open question how many states beyond the 18 that are party to ICCPR-OP2 will accept the African Death Penalty Abolition Protocol.112 It is also very uncertain if and when the AU policy organs will adopt the African Death Penalty Protocol, given that its adoption has been pending since 2015. In a hopeful sign that the impasse may be broken, in 2024 the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) endorsed the Protocol, and committed itself to collaborate with the African Commission and other stakeholders to advance its adoption by the AU Assembly.113

An equally commendable approach driven by collaborative efforts of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and scholars is the submission of a request for an advisory opinion by the Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) to the African Court in November 2024.114 The request seeks the Court’s advisory opinion concerning the compatibility of the death penalty with the provisions of the African Charter. This strategic initiative provides not only the applicant and interested parties but also the Court with another platform to streamline the interpretation of human rights norms towards the abolition of the death penalty in Africa.