Hazardous waste and the right to a healthy environment: reflections on the LIDHO decision of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

2.1 Hazardous waste and ‘the toxic trade’

The term ‘hazardous waste’ is defined under both the Basel Convention and the Bamako Convention.11 The Bamako Convention’s definition is however more elaborate and to that extent, preferable to that of the Basel Convention. According to the Bamako Convention, hazardous wastes include not only wastes listed under Annex I thereof and wastes defined as hazardous under domestic legislation of the state of export, import or transit, but also wastes with the characteristics listed under Annex II of the Convention; as well as hazardous substances which have been banned, cancelled or refused registration or voluntarily withdrawn from registration in the country of manufacture for human health and environmental reasons.12

Although the ‘toxic trade’ predates both the Basel and Bamako Conventions, it should be (legally) understood as trade in hazardous waste as defined thereunder. The inception of the international toxic waste trade is traceable to the late 1970s and grew through the 1980s onwards.13

Some scholars argue that international trade in hazardous waste among developed nations with the technical and technological know-how on handling such waste is a legitimate business venture.14 However, the same cannot be said where hazardous waste is ‘traded’ or dumped in African countries which tend to lack the facilities to dispose of such waste in an environmentally sound manner.15 The international trade in toxic or hazardous wastes in so far as it relates to and/or results into dumping of those wastes in (West) African countries has been presented as a question of morality.16 However, I argue below, toxic waste is not merely a moral but also a human rights issue.

2.2 Toxic waste dumping: a human rights issue?

The nexus between hazardous wastes and their transboundary movement, and harm to human health and the environment has been acknowledged already in international and regional legal instruments.17

Although the dumping of hazardous waste in Africa (developing countries) had started as early as the 1970s, it only received much public attention in the 1980s.18 Toxic waste dumping has been equated to environmental racism19 and decried as a form of toxic waste colonialism.20 According to Pratt, toxic waste colonialism occurs where ‘underdeveloped states are used as inexpensive alternatives for the export or disposal of hazardous waste pollution by developed states’.21 However, it is important to note that present day ‘toxic waste colonialism’ is predominantly perpetrated by multinational corporations from the North rather than states in concert with some corrupt officials and individual or corporate entities in the country where the waste is to be dumped.22

Toxic waste dumping negatively infringes the collective and individual human rights and fundamental freedoms of the residents of the areas where the waste is dumped. Hazardous waste invariably degrades and pollutes the environment of the places where it is dumped in addition to causing health problems and even death to the people in the affected areas.23 Deductively, it is not difficult to see the direct correlation of hazardous waste and its contravention of a flurry of rights such as the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment, the right to life and the right to health.24

2.3 Hazardous waste and environmental justice

It is estimated that about 90 per cent of hazardous waste is generated in the North and much of this ends up in the South in Africa, Asia, and Latin America for elimination or disposal.25 Previously, the hazardous waste ‘trade’ was justified on the premise that the Countries in the South where the waste was being sent had the spatial capacity to accommodate the waste and that they benefited economically.26 However, the absurdity of this argument was that it ignored the fact that these countries lacked the capacity to handle this waste in an environmentally sound manner.27 Nonetheless, this economic argument was entrenched and found support in the high echelons of power in international institutions like the World Bank.28 Sadly, this cynicism has continued to pervade the discussions on the transboundary movement of hazardous waste from the North to the South.29

The perception of hazardous waste as an environmental (in)justice and legal problem and not merely an economic venture is traceable to the period of the environmental justice movement which emerged from the times of the Civil Rights Movement in the US.30 It sprang up in response to the discriminatory practice at the time, of dumping hazardous waste in landfills near the homes of ethnic minorities.31 A practice that came to be known as environmental racism.32 A cardinal precept of environmental justice is that all people are equally entitled to the right to live in a healthy environment and that environmental harm should be shared equitably among social groups.33 Fundamentally, the concept of environmental justice ‘is premised on the right to a healthy and safe environment, equitable share of resources, the right not to suffer unfairly from environmental policies, laws and regulations including a reasonable access to justice, information and participation in decision making’.34

Besides the evolution of the environmental justice movement, the adoption of stricter environmental legal and regulatory regimes in the North and the high cost of disposing of waste in an environmentally sound manner incentivised corporations to look for dumping sites in the South with less stringent laws.35 Some scholars argue that the treatment of the problem of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste as binary, focusing on the Global North (rich countries) dumping waste in the Global South (poor countries), is a generalised and simplistic approach.36 However, the statistics suggest otherwise and overwhelmingly point to the fact that much of the toxic waste dumped in the South and particularly Africa originates from the Global North.37 The several incidents of hazardous waste being dumped in countries in the South from the North are self-evident.38 The Koko dumping incident in Nigeria is one such incident and it catapulted the issue of dumping of hazardous waste in Africa to global publicity in the 1980s and highlighted the need for appropriate regulation.39

3.1 The Basel Convention: a historical perspective

In the 1980s Africa was fast becoming a dumpsite for hazardous waste from industrialsed nations.41 To address this illicit transboundary movement and dumping of hazardous waste from the North and in effect protect the South which had weak legal and regulatory frameworks, the Basel Convention was adopted.42 The Basel Convention was adopted as an international legal framework to tackle the problem of dumping hazardous waste from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to non-OECD countries.43 However, preceding the adoption of the Basel Convention, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had earlier in 1981 already highlighted the ‘Transport, handling and disposal of toxic and dangerous wastes’ as one of the three areas that required global action in the form of guidelines, principles, or agreements.44 Furthermore, after the first Montevideo Programme but before the adoption of the Basel Convention, the UNEP governing council adopted the Cairo Guidelines in 1987 to serve as a point of reference for states in the process of developing policies for the environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes.45 The Basel Convention was therefore predicated on these earlier developments.

The Basel Convention is hailed for having garnered international consensus to regulate the transboundary movement of hazardous waste.46 It has provided a foundation for subsequent international, regional, and national legal instruments, guidelines, and protocols adopted on the subject of hazardous waste.47 It is seen as the global regulatory yardstick for the international transboundary movement of hazardous waste.48 Although praised for its spearheading role in the regulation of hazardous waste, the Basel Convention can be equally castigated for the apparent inadequacy in its definition of the term ‘waste’. The Convention defines ‘wastes’ as ‘substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of national law’.49

Without a clear definition of waste, policy and regulatory gaps are likely to arise since waste might mean different things to different people in different countries with different socio-cultural, political, and economic connotations.50 For instance, what might be waste in one country, might only be second-hand goods in another.51 However, although this criticism of the Basel Convention might hold some truth, the Convention sets clear parameters of what constitutes ‘hazardous waste’ which is the primary subject of the discourse in this commentary.

The Basel Convention adopts what is called the list technique or approach. It lists the various substances under Annexes. It goes on to distinguish ‘hazardous waste’ from ‘other waste’ (Annex II).52 Hazardous waste is that which belongs to the category in Annex I unless it lacks any of the features in Annex III and it also includes waste designated as hazardous under domestic legislation of the state of export, import, or transit.53 As for ‘other waste’ is that which falls under the category listed in Annex II.54 Further clarification on the terms

‘hazardous waste’ and ‘other waste’ was attained at the 1998 Conference of the Parties with the adoption of Annexes VIII and IX.55 Annex VIII contains waste qualified as hazardous under article 1(1)(a) of the Convention and Annex IX lists waste not deemed hazardous and thus outside the Convention’s purview unless it contains any of the substances listed in Annex I, in a quantity sufficient to exhibit any of the hazardous characteristics under Annex III. Therefore, by studying the different Annexes, one can ascertain which substances are ‘hazardous waste’.

The following precepts are identifiable as the cardinal building blocks of the Basel Convention namely; the reduction of the generation of hazardous waste to a minimum;56 the environmentally sound disposal of waste as close to the source of generation as possible;57 absolute prohibition of exports of hazardous waste to non-parties58 and to other parties in certain cases i.e. to states which have prohibited imports59 or lack capacity for appropriate disposal, or from an OECD state to a non-OECD state;60 compliance with the prior informed consent (PIC) procedure established under the Convention when exporting hazardous waste;61 reimport of hazardous waste.62

The Basel Convention obliges parties to designate relevant competent authorities for the purposes of implementing the provisions of the treaty.63 These competent authorities are very instrumental to the PIC procedure under the Convention. It is the competent authorities of the respective states of import and export of hazardous waste that have to share correspondences and information before a waste consignment is approved for movement, when the competent authority of the state of export or the intending exporter has to notify the competent authority of the state of import about the intended waste consignment.64 The notification has to be accompanied by all the relevant information and documentation concerning the waste consignment. It is after the competent authority of the state of import gives a green light to the consignment that the competent authority can then approve the intended export.65

This PIC procedure established under the Basel Convention ensures transparency and allows developing countries the opportunity to scrutinise hazardous waste before it can be shipped to their

territories. Non-compliance with the PIC procedure has consequences.66 Although beyond the scope of this essay, it is apt to note that hazardous chemicals may qualify as hazardous waste if they meet the elements listed under Annex I and Annex III of the Basel Convention. Hence, there’s now synergy between the Basel Convention and the international legal regimes on hazardous chemicals.67 In fact, the Basel Convention, the Rotterdam PIC Convention, and the Stockholm POPs Convention now have a single Secretariat serving the three conventions.68

3.2 The Bamako Convention: a comparison with the Basel Convention

As a flexibility tool, the Basel Convention allows for the adoption of bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements on the transboundary movement of waste provided such agreements do not stipulate less stringent measures.69 In that case, the Basel Convention becomes the lex generalis while the other Agreement becomes the lex specialis.70 This is what gave legal premise to the adoption of the Bamako Convention71 which was intended to ban the import of hazardous waste into Africa. At the time, most African states felt that the Basel Convention did not go far enough, its primary objective being regulation rather than outright prohibition and reduction of generation rather than elimination of the transboundary movement of hazardous waste.72 Although it gave discretion to states to adopt preventive and punitive measures against the illegal trafficking of hazardous waste,73 the Basel Convention was chided for the lack of a robust enforcement mechanism to hold the ‘dumpers’ accountable for the harm resulting from their dumping activities.74 The transboundary movement of hazardous waste is usually conducted clandestinely and hazardous waste is at times misrepresented as harmless items like fertilizer.75 Therefore, the general feeling among African nations was that the Convention’s regulatory objective left a lacuna which could be exploited by potential ‘dumpers’.

UNEP has more succinctly described the inspiration for the Bamako Convention thus:76

The impetus for the Bamako Convention arose also from the failure of the Basel Convention to prohibit trade of hazardous waste to less developed countries (LDCs); and [T]he realisation that many developed nations were exporting toxic wastes to Africa (Koko case in Nigeria, Probo Koala case in Ivory Coast).

The most distinctive stipulation of the Bamako Convention is the idea of banning the import of hazardous waste into Africa.77 It obliges parties to take necessary legal, administrative, and other measures to ban or prohibit the import of hazardous waste from non-party states.78 Where a party fails to comply with this obligation then it might be held responsible for any resulting human rights violations.79 Imports of hazardous waste are prima facie deemed illegal and criminal.80 The Bamako Convention also explicitly prohibits dumping of hazardous waste at sea or in the internal waters.81 The Basel Convention has no equivalent provision. The Bamako Convention goes a notch higher than the Basel Convention not only recognizing in its preamble but also its substantive provisions, the negative impact which the transboundary movement of hazardous waste movement potentially poses to both human health and the environment.82

The Bamako Convention provides for unrestricted joint and several liability against the generators of hazardous waste.83 This provision permits the imposition of whatever damages are considered proper in the circumstances, including punitive damages.84 This disincentivises the generation of hazardous waste thereby nipping the hazardous waste problem at source. The Convention also sets higher standards by stipulating the application of preventive and precautionary approaches in the generation and management of hazardous wastes.85 This means that even without scientific evidence of harm to the environment, states and other stakeholders are nonetheless obliged to pay due regard to potential dangers posed by hazardous waste. Similar to the Basel Convention, the Bamako Convention has an equally elaborate PIC procedure as a condition precedent for any potential transboundary movement of hazardous waste.86 However, the Bamako Convention is more stringent than the Basel Convention on the PIC procedural requirements. Whereas the latter Convention allows for the state of export to sanction the transboundary movement of hazardous waste if the state of transit does not respond to a notification within 60 days, the former (Bamako) convention, explicitly obliges the state of export to not allow [under any circumstances] the transboundary movement to commence until it has received the written consent of the state of transit.87

The stringency of the Bamako Convention’s provisions and its overall objective of banning the transboundary movement or import of hazardous waste into Africa has been criticised as a hindrance to the economic activities associated with the trade in hazardous waste.88 As opposed to a total ban, it has been proposed that minimal waste trade should be allowed where a developing country certifies the required competence backed by the presence of the requisite disposal facilities.89 However, this argument is inherently problematic. It seems to ignore the fact that the economics on which it is predicated was the genesis of the problem of dumping in the first place i.e. developed countries dishing out monetary incentives in exchange for the developing countries agreeing to the dumping of hazardous waste.90 The criticism also ignores the fact that most African states have not developed sufficient capacity to deal with hazardous waste.91 Therefore, it would be disingenuous to wave the economic incentives card as if a magical wand to trump the environmental and human health cost attendant to the dumping of hazardous waste.92 In the African context, the Bamako Convention, banning the transboundary movement of hazardous waste into Africa, though not a panacea, is a more appropriate legal solution to the dumping problem.

In light of the foregoing, it can be deduced that the African (regional) legal framework regulating the transboundary movement of hazardous waste is more stringent than the international framework. However, the recurrence of the illicit transboundary movement of hazardous waste raises questions as to the effectiveness of both legal regimes.93

4.1 International legal status

Presently, there are two opposing views under international human rights law about the right to a healthy environment.94 One view is that the right to a healthy environment as a stand-alone right does not exist.95 On the other hand, it is argued that the right does exist.96 The former view is premised on the absence of any stipulation of the right in the main international human rights instruments.97 The latter view associates itself with the fact that the right to a healthy environment already finds expression in national constitutions, regional treaties, and international ‘soft law’ instruments.98 This view seems more tenable because although the right to a healthy environment only finds expression in ‘soft’ international legal instruments, this does not whittle down its normative weight and justiciability. Moreover, the non-binding nature of soft law instruments does not mean they are legally irrelevant.99 On the contrary, these soft law instruments like United Nations General Assembly resolutions and Declarations often crystallise into hard law and even Customary international law.100

However, the need to have the right to a healthy environment captured in a binding international legal instrument is equally important. Much as the existing Economic and Social Rights (ESRs) like the right to water and sanitation, the right to adequate housing, right to health and others help guarantee some of the cardinal attributes of a decent environment, the stipulation of the right to a healthy environment in an internationally binding treaty would make a positive addition to the corpus of ESRs i.e., a more explicit focus on environmental protection.101 Otherwise, if the right to a healthy environment lacks legally binding status then it may easily be eclipsed by other more normative considerations like economic development and natural resource exploitation.102

There is no universal definition of the right to a healthy environment. However, UNEP and OHCHR have explained that the right to a healthy environment has both substantive and procedural dimensions or components.103 The substantive elements of the right to a healthy environment include clean air; a safe and stable climate; access to safe water and adequate sanitation; healthy and sustainably produced food.104 On the other hand, the procedural elements of the right to a healthy environment comprise what is collectively termed ‘procedural environmental rights’ or ‘participatory rights’ namely, access to information, the right to participate in decision-making, and access to justice and effective remedies, including the secure exercise of these rights free from reprisals.105

The ultimate objective of the right to a healthy environment as with most other rights seems to be more anthropocentric than anything else. This is deducible from this observation by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment:106

All human beings depend on the environment in which we live. A safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment is integral to the full enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, including the rights to life, health, food, water and sanitation. Without a healthy environment, we are unable to fulfil our aspirations. We may not have access to even the minimum standards of human dignity.

Although the concept of the right to a clean and healthy environment, as we know it today, was non-existent and undeveloped on the international stage before 1972, other rights linked to the environment and its protection such as the right to life, health, and others existed under international human rights law.107 However, it was at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm that the right to a healthy environment first received formal enunciation.108

However, save for spurring developments at the regional level, the events at the 1972 Conference did little to influence the crystallization of the right to a healthy environment under international human rights law.109 Even the subsequent 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de Janeiro made a more procedural rather than substantive contribution to the right to a healthy environment.110 Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration merely provided that ‘[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature’.111

On the international stage, further substantive impetus was given to the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment in 2021 when it was recognised by the UN Human Rights Council as a human right.112 This recognition of the right to a healthy environment has been optimistically touted as a reflection of UN member states’ strong political commitment to such a right and that it could be a catalyst for further substantive development of the right, internationally.113 Perhaps more significant was the subsequent recognition of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable development by the United Nations General Assembly in 2022.114 Given the symbolic, political, and relative legal weight of the UN General Assembly resolutions, it is expected that this recognition of the right to a healthy environment is bound to have catalytic effects and has great potential to nudge states and other stakeholders into action to give effect to the right.115 This resolution could even serve as an authority for both the litigants and the courts in environmental litigation.116

The Aarhus Convention

As already noted, the Rio Declaration spawned the procedural constituents of the right to a healthy environment.117 Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provided the legal blueprint for the subsequent adoption of regional Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) on participatory rights in environmental matters.118 Most notable is the 1998 Aarhus Convention.119 It was tailored along the contours of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration. It has three cardinal pillars namely, access to information, public participation, and access to justice in environmental matters.120 Under the Aarhus Convention’s implementation mechanism, the Compliance Committee,121 concerned citizens including Non-Governmental organizations are empowered to complain against states that are not observing their obligations in ensuring participatory rights for all in environmental matters, without discrimination.122

The African Charter and the Algiers Convention

In the African context, besides the substantive provision for the right to a general satisfactory environment in the African Charter,123 procedural environmental rights are provided for in the African Nature Conservation Convention as revised in 2003. State parties are obliged to adopt appropriate legislative and regulatory measures to ensure the timely and appropriate dissemination of environmental information, access of the public to environmental information, public participation in environmental matters, and access to justice.124 Although not as detailed as the Aarhus Convention, the provisions of the Algiers Convention on procedural rights are couched in terms bold enough to ensure sufficient protection of those rights.125

In confirmation of the procedural dimension of the right to a healthy environment under the African Charter, the African Commission on Human Rights in the SERAC case, acknowledged that the right to a healthy environment entails obligations for states to ensure the enjoyment of procedural environmental rights for those affected by environmental decisions.126 The Commission found that upholding the right to a satisfactory environment inter alia requires carrying out environmental and social impact studies and publicizing information from such studies before carrying out major industrial developments.127 The right to a healthy environment is thus well entrenched in the African human rights instruments and is perhaps only paralleled by the most recent MEA for the Americas, the Escazú Agreement.128

4.3 National legal framework: Côte d’Ivoire

Apart from the highlighted international and regional developments, nationally, it is estimated that the right to a healthy environment finds some form of expression or formulation in the domestic constitutions of over 110 countries.129 Over 35 African countries recognise a right to a healthy environment in their national constitutions.130 The significance of the stipulation of the right to a healthy environment in National Constitutions cannot be over-emphasised. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment:

Constitutional protection for human rights is essential, because the constitution represents the highest and strongest law in a domestic legal system. Furthermore, the constitution plays an important cultural role, reflecting a society’s values and aspirations.131

Contextually, the right to a general satisfactory environment provided for in the African Charter enjoins states to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to it.132 The states’ obligation is four-fold namely, respect, protect, promote and fulfill the right to a satisfactory environment.133 In the SERAC case the African Commission held:134

[T]he State is obliged to protect right-holders against other subjects by legislation and provision of effective remedies. This obligation requires the State to take measures to protect beneficiaries of the protected rights against political, economic and social interferences.

The Commission further held:135

The right to a general satisfactory environment under article 24 of the Charter, (...) imposes clear obligations upon a government. It requires the state to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources.

5.1 Significance of the Court’s orders

The Court’s reparative orders are far-reaching. They aimed to not only provide justice for the victims but also cause comprehensive structural, and institutional shifts to ensure that such an incident would never recur. The orders are expounded on below. Interestingly, Côte d’Ivoire attempted to evade the Court’s jurisdiction by withdrawing its instrument deposited under article 34(6) of the Court Protocol.156

Having found that Côte d’Ivoire had violated the rights of the victims by authorising the dumping of hazardous waste and failing in its due diligence obligation to check the toxicity of the waste and also failing to ensure that a proper clean-up was made, the Court found the state liable to provide compensation to the victims for the prejudice they had suffered as a result.157 The Court ordered the state to set up a compensation fund in consultation with the victims.158 It extended the pool of those to benefit from the fund to ‘all victims without exception’.159 The significance of this holding is inherent in the fact that it enables those victims who were or could have been denied compensation on the technical ground of having never participated in the court proceedings at the national level. For the Court, the basis for compensation had to be the prejudice suffered.160

The Court ordered the state to pay the ninety five billion francs received from Trafigura into the compensation fund and this obligation extended to supplementing the fund with resources from the state itself ‘in case the money received from Trafigura is insufficient’.161

The Court’s order concerning the compensation fund tightens the loopholes which would have otherwise enabled the state to wash itself clean of the obligation to compensate the victims after injecting the Trafigura monies in the compensation fund. By the order of the Court, the state had an extensive duty to ensure that all the victims received compensation even if this meant digging into state coffers. Such an order is not only equitable but also serves as a cautionary tale to all state parties to the African Charter that dereliction of the duty to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of their citizens will have repercussions, including economic ones.

Besides the foregoing orders on compensation, the applicants also requested the Court for non-pecuniary compensation. These included orders for an independent investigation into the alleged facts aimed at establishing individual criminal liability and prosecution of the perpetrators, the implementation of legislative and regulatory reforms outlawing the import and dumping of hazardous waste and stationing an official of the Ministry of the Environment at all ports with power to inspect waste on board ships.162

The Court observed that to ensure the non-repetition of the violations enumerated in this particular case it was pertinent to address the ‘structural causes’.163 The Court therefore ordered Côte d’Ivoire to implement legislative and regulatory reforms prohibiting the import and dumping of hazardous waste in its territory as obligated under the Bamako Convention.164 The Court went further to order the respondent state, within one year, to amend its national laws to ensure that corporate entities including multinationals like Trafigura can be held liable both under civil and criminal law for their harmful acts to the environment and the handling of toxic waste.165 It is fair to observe with a measure of optimism that with these legal reforms, if fully implemented, comes stronger legal empowerment of the victims of similar human rights violations (in Côte d’Ivoire). It also becomes harder if not impossible (in the future) for the state to undermine the victims’ pursuit for justice by entering into questionable compromises with the culprits of environmental crimes and human rights violations.

The state was further ordered to station at least a representative at all its ports with power to monitor waste removal from ships.166 However, stationing inspectors at each port is one thing and them executing their duties incorruptibly is another. But again, this perhaps goes back to both the Court’s orders for legislative and regulatory reforms and organising training for civil servants.167 The Court directed Côte d’Ivoire to submit a report every six months until the Court is satisfied that full implementation of its decision has been achieved.168 This measure aims to protect against the potential of noncompliance.

Taken as a whole, the Court’s dictum on the obligation of private business entities to respect human rights significantly lends normative (legal) weight to the 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as an accountability tool for human rights violations. It also sets a seminal precedent with the potential to spur further accountability actions against multinational business entities that infringe on the right to a healthy environment and other rights. Although the Court did not itself explicitly declare or hold Trafigura responsible for the human rights violations suffered by the victims of its hazardous waste, ordering Côte d’Ivoire to amend its laws to ensure that victims can both civilly and criminally hold corporate entities liable is a significant development. This development is also a clear signal to other African state parties to the Bamako Convention and the African Charter to overhaul their legal and regulatory frameworks lest they find themselves in the undesirable situation in which Côte d’Ivoire found itself.

Furthermore, the Court’s far-reaching orders on both pecuniary and non-pecuniary reparation demonstrate the gravitas which it accords to protection of human rights. The extensive manner in which it ordered Côte d’Ivoire to effect systemic legal, institutional and regulatory reforms is commendable as it does not only superficially solve the case at hand but ensures the non-repetition of the impugned violations.